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Dictionaries are word museums. Like archaeologists at a dig, lexicogra
phers mine the language through the eons for patterns of usage. Language
'
evolves, and yesterday's meaning may disguise today's nuance.

The claims of a patent are central to virtually every aspect of patent law.
The claims define the scope of the invention, and their meaning therefore
determines both whether a defendant's product infringes a patent and
whether the patent is valid. One of the most significant aspects of patent

litigation is "claim construction," the process of defining the words of the
2
claim in other, theoretically clearer words. Courts construe the claims of the

t
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I.

Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 876 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir.1989).

2.

See Scripps Clinic & Research Found.

v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed.Cir.

1991) ("[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim lan
guage ... .
"). One may reasonably doubt whether layering new words on top of old necessarily adds

to the clarity of the claims.See,

e.g., Dan L.Burk & Mark A.Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9
LEWIS & Ct.ARK L. REv. 29 (2005); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 44 (2000) (rejecting the idea of a plain meaning in claim construction); cf William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Cot.UM.L.REV. 609, 679 (1990) (explaining
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patent by starting with the plain meaning of their terms as they would be
understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art, or PHOSITA. Claim
"Markman hearing."3 In

construction occurs in every patent case during a

deed, claim construction is so important to patent litigation that once the
court construes the claims, most patent cases settle,4 and those that do not
5
are often decided on summary judgment. As Judge Rich succinctly put it,
6
"the name of the game is the claim."
In order to construe the claims of a patent, the court must fix the mean
ing of the claim terms as of a particular point in time. Both the knowledge
of the PHOSITA in a particular field and the meaning of particular terms to
that PHOSITA will frequently change over time.7 Indeed, the risk of change
in the meaning of terms over time is particularly great in patent law, because
patents necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to
describe those new ideas is not static. As the Supreme Court recognized
many years ago, "it does not follow that when a newly invented or discov
ered thing is called by some familiar word, which comes nearest to
expressing the new idea, that the thing so styled is really the thing formerly
8
meant by the familiar word." In that case, the Court found that the meaning
of the term "bridge" in a 1790 statute did not mean the same thing in 1860
after the development of railroad bridges. The term was the same, but its
scope had changed over time in response to changes in technology.
But at which point in time shall we fix the meaning of the claims? It is a
fundamental principle of patent law that the time as of which we determine
how dictionaries don't avoid the problem of subjectivity of language, because the decisionmaker

must choose among different definitions based on their own subjective understanding of meaning).

3.

In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Supreme Court

decided that construction of the claims of the patent was a question of law for the court, just as
courts

are responsible for construing other legal documents such as statutes and contracts. As a

result, courts hold pretrial "Markman hearings" to define the meaning of the claims.

4.

For example, Kimberly Moore found that cases settled earlier in the Northern District of

California, which has regimented procedures requiring disclosure of infringement and validity con
tentions and a relatively early

Markman hearing, and later in the District of Delaware, which often
Markman hearing until just before (or even during) trial. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 911
(2001); see also DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION§ 33.223, at 649
delays the

(4th ed. 2005) ("Early claim construction may also facilitate settlement . ...
"). The overwhelming
majority of patent lawsuits settle before trial. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1501 (2001) ("The overwhelming majority of [patent] law
suits settle or are abandoned before trial."); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases
An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).
5.

See HERR, supra note 4,

at 649.

Giles S. Rich. Extent of Protection and Intemretation
6.
21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).

of Claims-American Perspectives,

7.
See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, A bolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004).
8.

Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68

v. Wethered, 76

U.S (I Wall.) 116, 147 (1864); see also Bischoff
U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 816 (1869); Samuel A. Thumrna & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The
.

Lexicon Has Become a Fonress: The United States Supreme Coun's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF.
L. REv. 227, 299 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court's reliance on contemporaneous dictionaries to
interpret statutes).
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the meaning of claim terms varies depending on what legal rule is at issue.
Where the question is one of novelty or nonobviousness-whether the in
vention is truly new-the courts compare the patented invention to the prior
art as both were understood

at the time of the invention.

Where the question

is one of enablement or written description-whether the inventor under
stood and described the invention in sufficient detail--courts evaluate the
adequacy of the disclosure based on the meaning of the claims

the patent application was filed.

at the time

Where the question involves the meaning of

a special patent claim element called a "means-plus-function" claim, courts
evaluate the scope of that claim element

at the time the patent issues.

And

where the question involves alleged infringement of the patent, courts evalu
ate infringement in at least some circumstances based on the meaning of the
claim

at the time of infringement.

What claim terms would mean to one of

ordinary skill in the art therefore may depend on what legal rule is at issue,
and therefore the time as of which we ask the question.
An equally fundamental principle of patent law is that patent claims
must be construed as an integrated whole. A patent claim may not be treated
"like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by
merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something
9
more than, or something different from, what its words express." In particu
lar, patentees (or accused infringers, for that matter) are not permitted to
argue that a patent claim means one thing when it comes to validity and
something else entirely when it comes to infringement. Instead, courts give
claims a single meaning in any given case, engaging in only one act of claim
construction for any given patent. Under this principle, patent claim terms
have a single definite meaning. In part this is a matter of fundamental fair
ness-a sense that what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. But it
is also necessary if a patent is to put the public on notice of what the pat
entee owns.
These two principles contradict each other. The meaning of technologi
cal terms is fluid. A term that means one thing to scientists at one time may
mean something different later as understanding in the field increases. Be
cause both patent prosecution and patent litigation can take years and even
decades, 10 fixing the time at which we determine the meaning of any given

term may tum out to matter in a substantial number of cases. When the

9.

White v . Du nbar, 1 19 U.S. 47, 5 1 ( 1 886).

10. Patent prosecution takes just u nder th ree years o n average, see John R. Allison & Mark
A. Lemle y, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2099, 2 1 1 8 (2000) [here inafter A llison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?], but the practice of
"co ntinuation" app lications can extend that to decades. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 1 2 1-23 (2004) (docume nting patent
app lications taking as Jong as 68 years to issue). O nce the patent issues, it take s time for the pate ntee
to detect infringement and sue, and more time for the case to be resolved. As a result, the e lapsed
t ime between the first fi ling of a pate nt applicatio n and the final resolution of a case that goes to
judgment is a mean of 1 2 .3 years and a median of 1 1 .3 years. John R. A lliso n & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 A IPLA Q.J. 1 85, 236 tbl. 1 1 ( 1 998)
[hereinafter A llison & Lemle y, Empirical Evidence].
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meaning of a patent claim term changes over time, the first principle would
give that term a different meaning for validity purposes than for infringe
ment purposes. But in doing so, the court would undermine the second
principle, since the claim term will not mean the same thing for all pur
poses, and it may indeed be impossible to determine the scope of a patent at
all on an ex ante basis.
This tension has been latent for some time, but it came to a head in

pe rguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises.

11

Su

In that case, the question was

whether a 1985 patent application that used the claim term "regularly re
ceived television signal" could be construed to cover digital television
signals that were not developed until well after the patent issued. The Fed
eral Circuit held that it could, relying on the well-established principle that
the meaning of the claim term for infringement purposes was determined as
of the time of infringement, not the earlier filing date. Judge Michel dis
sented. He started with the assumption that the meaning of the claims was
fixed as of 1985, and concluded that the claim language in question would
not have been understood

in 1985 to cover digital television. Both the ma

jority

are

and

the

dissent

correct

within

their

own

spheres;

their

disagreement comes from the fact that they start from fundamentally differ
12
ent principles. Other cases have presented the same problem.
In Part I of this paper, I document the distinguished pedigree of both

principles. In Part II, I argue that patent claim terms should have a fixed
meaning throughout time and that this meaning should be fixed at the time
the patent application is first filed. Part II also discusses some complications

11.

358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

12. See PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp. , 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (finding that claim language referring to an J/O port "normally connectible to a conventional
computer input/output port" required connectibility to a "port that was in common use at the time of
filing in 1988"); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Schering,
the question was the meaning of the term "IFN-a," which was originally used to refer to a particular
type of interferon but was ultimately understood by scientists to refer to several different classes of
proteins, of which the patentee was only concerned with one. The court held that "[t]he [claim] term
as used in the . . . patent . . . did not and could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace tech
nology arising after its filing." Id. at 1353; see Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, S.
CAL. L. REV (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 24-26, on file with author) (discussing this case).
Cf. Middleton, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (referring
interchangeably to the invention date and the filing date as the relevant time for fixing meaning).
The question was also squarely presented in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247
(Fed. Cir. 2004), but the court declined to resolve the "dilemma" of "this complex claim construc
tion question," deciding instead to affirm the jury's finding that the patent was invalid for failure to
describe and enable the full scope of the claims. Id. at 1258. Since the invalidity findings depended
on the meaning of the claims, which in tum depended on the time at which they were construed, it
seems the court should have resolved the issue.
The JYI'O has recognized the problem in one specific context-patent claims that include as an
element a trademarked product such as Teflon or Velcro. The JYI'O forbids such references because it
recognizes that the composition of the product referred to by the trademark may change over time.
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMIN
ING PROCEDURE § 608.0 l(v) {8th ed., rev. 2 2004). I am indebted to Shashank Upadhye for this
example.

The Changing Meaning
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that arise as a result of the prosecution process and how to deal with the
problem of later-developed technology.
I. PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A.

Situating the Meaning of Claim Terms in Time

Claim construction is a versatile creature, underlying virtually every

doctrine in patent law. The role of claim construction is always to define the
scope of the claims, though the reasons we want to define that scope differ
depending on the legal rule in question. In this Section, I discuss the most
common cases in which claim construction affects substantive patent deter
minations of validity or infringement. In each case, the application of the
legal principle is bound up with the understanding of a hypothetical person
3
having ordinary skill in the art, or PHOSITA. 1 The role of the PHOSITA is
significant for our purposes, because the meaning of claim terms is also de
termined by asking what the PHOSITA would understand them to mean. 14
There is a natural and understandable tendency to define the PHOSITA for
claim construction purposes as the same person with the same knowledge as
the PHOSITA for validity and infringement purposes, though that may in
5
fact be an error. 1
·

1. Novelty and Nonobviousness
In order to decide whether a patented invention is novel and nonobvious,
we must know what the patent covers, because a patent covering a range of
devices or chemicals will be held invalid if even a single one of those cov

ered devices exists in the prior art. 16 Whether the device exists in the prior
art for novelty purposes is determined by reading the relevant references

to determine whether the PHOSITA would have understood that the refer
ences taught the claimed invention. 17 Whether an invention is obvious is

13. On the role of the PHOSITA in patent law, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, ls Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002), and John 0. Tresansky,
PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 37 (1991). See also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT§ 4.3 (5th ed.
2001); Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who ls the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent
Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REv. 267 (2002).
14. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane),
ajf'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
15. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1189-90 (noting that the two PHOSITAs are logi
cally distinct).
16. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. M21-81BSJ, 2004 WL 1171254, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) ("Where a patent claims a genus,
prior art disclosing even one species within the genus invalidates the entire claim.").
17. See, e.g., In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973). One significant exception to this
rule is the inherency doctrine, under which a prior art reference can anticipate a later invention if the
invention was inherently present in the prior art and the public was receiving the benefit of the in
vention, even if people weren't aware of it. See, e.g., In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 30 l F.3d 1343
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determined by asking whether the PHOSITA would have found the differ
8
ences between the prior art and the claimed invention obvious. 1 Novelty and
9
nonobviousness are both determined as of the date of invention. 1 Because
novelty and nonobviousness both focus on what the PHOSITA would under
stand from the prior art at the time the invention was made, it seems to make
sense that the meaning of claim terms should also be determined as of the
date of invention. And indeed the Federal Circuit has held in the context of

§§ 102 and 103 that "claims are to be given their ordinary and objective
meaning as of the time of the invention."20

2. Enablement and Written Description
In order to decide whether a patentee has sufficiently disclosed and de
scribed her invention, we must know what the patent covers, because the
statute requires the patent to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make
and use the full range of the claimed invention,21 and the court has construed
the written description doctrine to require proof that the patentee possessed
the full range of the claimed invention.22 Without knowing how broad the
patent is, a court can't determine whether a person of ordinary skill in the art
would be able to make and use the full range of the invention. Similarly, it
would be impossible to know whether the patentee in fact possessed the in
vention without defining the scope of that invention using the patent claims.
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the patent on newly discovered cancer-fighting benefit of eating broc
coli was anticipated because people have been eating broccoli and gaining the benefit for millennia,
even if they weren't aware of the benefit). Under the inherency doctrine, the time at which the
PHOSITA must understand that the invention was anticipated is delayed, but the time at which the
anticipation itself is tested remains the time at which the invention is made. For a discussion of the
contours of the inherency doctrine, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, WM. & MARY
L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Inherency].
18.
35 U.S.C.§ 103 (2000). This is concededly a somewhat circular definition, and obvious
ness, like negligence in tort law, is a somewhat broad-based inquiry. Courts have taken some steps to
try to cabin the essential amorphousness of the doctrine. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. I (1966) (adding secondary or "objective" considerations to nonobviousness analysis); In re
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (requiring proof of motivation to combine in order to
combine prior art references); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting the "obvi
ous to try" standard). But the underlying inquiry remains a judgment call based on what the
PHOSITA would believe.
19.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g) (2000) (refusing to grant a patent if certain events occur
"before the invention" by the patentee); 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (determining obviousness from
the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art "at the time the invention was made.").

A separate set of rules in section 102 deal not with prior art that predates the patentee's inven
tion, but art that was created after the patentee's invention but more than a year before the patentee
filed a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Section 102(b) involves what are known as
statutory bars to patenting, rather than novelty per se. For purposes of section 102(b), the meaning
of claim terms is fixed as of the date the prior art becomes relevant--one year before the application
is filed-rather than the date of invention.

20.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Plant Ge
netic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v.
Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
21.

35 U.S.C.§ 112, para. 1 (2000).

22.

See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Satisfaction of the enablement and written description requirements is de
23
termined at the time the patent application is first filed. This is also true in
other contexts in which enablement is at issue. In In re Hogan, for example,
the court determined whether a patent applicant had enabled the claim in
order to prevail in an interference proceeding (that is, whether he had in fact
made the invention as claimed) by interpreting the term "polypropylene" as
it was understood at the time the senior application was first filed, rather
than as the term was later understood:
[The] 1 953 application enabled those skilled in the art in 1 953 to make and
use 'a solid polymer' as described in claim 13. Appellants disclosed, as the
only then existing way to make such

a polymer,

a method of making the

crystalline form. To now say that appellants should have disclosed in 1953
the amorphous form which on this record did not exist until 1962, would
be to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent sys
tem. 24

Because the inquiry focuses on what the PHOSITA would understand at
the time the patent application was filed, it seems to make sense that the
meaning of claim terms should also be determined as of the date the appli
cation was filed. And in fact the Federal Circuit has held in the context of
§ 112 that the district court "properly gave objective meaning to [the claims]
25
as they were understood at the time the patent application was filed." In
deed, the court adopted this timing in Plant Genetics, the same case in
which it held that § 102 determinations are based on the meaning of claim
terms at the time of invention. Courts have also applied the filing date to the
26
related doctrine of claim definiteness.
3. Means-Plus-Function Claims

Patent claims generally define devices, structures, or methods. At times,
however, patentees want to claim part of an invention by defining it in func
tional terms (for example, "means for processing data") rather than by
defining the actual structure of the device in the claim. Section 112, 'lI 6 of
the patent statute permits a patentee to phrase claim elements in such a way
and provides that the scope of such a claim element is determined by the
corresponding structure described in the patent specification and equivalents

23. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563--M (Fed. Cir. 1991). Strictly
speaking, satisfaction of those requirements is determined as of the earliest time to which the pat
entee claims priority. In some cases, patent applicants may add new descriptive matter to their
applications by filing what is called a "continuation-in-part" ("CIP") application. Claims in a CIP
application must be enabled by the disclosure in the original application only if the patentee asserts
that she invented the claimed subject matter as of the date of the original application.
24. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977); accord United States Steel Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 865F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
25. Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1345; see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26.

Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd., 401F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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27
thereof. Thus, defining the scope of a patent claim term phrased in this
"means-plus-function" format requires determining what the patentee dis
closed in the specification, and what structures are equivalent to the ones
disclosed. Understanding the scope of this type of claim requires determin
ing what the PHOSITA would understand the specification to mean at the
28
time the patent issues and what would be equivalent to the structures dis
29
closed in the specification as of that time. Because of this, it makes a
certain amount of sense that the meaning of particular terms in the patent
should also be determined at the time the patent issues, and indeed the Fed
eral Circuit has made it clear that the meaning of such means-plus-function
30
claim terms is determined as of the time the patent issues. Unlike the valid
ity doctrines discussed above, however, it is terms in the specification rather
than claim terms themselves that are being construed.
4. Infringement
Finally, and most obviously, interpretation of patent claims is critical to
deciding whether a defendant's product infringes the patent. Claim construc
tion is often outcome-determinative in infringement cases; once the patent
claims have been construed summary judgment for one side or the other is
quite common. Claim construction determines the scope of the patent, and
the scope of the patent in turn determines whether it covers the defendant's
product. Whether an accused device infringes is tested as of the time of the
alleged infringement; there are numerous cases in which devices first devel
3
oped after the patent issues are nonetheless held to infringe the patent. 1
Indeed, the application of patents to technologies first developed after the
patent issues is integral to a number of long-standing patent doctrines, in
cluding the doctrine of equivalents, the rule of blocking patents, and the so27.

35 U.S.C.§ 112, para. 6 (2000).

28. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'I, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("An
equivalent structure or act under§ 112 cannot embrace technology developed after the issuance of
the patent because the literal meaning of a claim isfixed upon its issuance." (emphasis added)).
29.
Id. (noting that "a structural equivalent under§ 112 must have been available at the time
of issuance of the claim"; any other equivalent can be captured only under the doctrine of equiva
lents); accord Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
30.

A l-Site, 174 F.3d at 1320.

31. See, e.g., Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974)
(finding that a patent on using a beam of light to align pipe covered the use of a laser to align pipe,
even though the laser had not been developed when the invention was made); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d
595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (concluding that an invention enabled at an early time with narrow scope
covered a broader scope of later-developed products that fit within the (expanded) literal definition
of the claimed invention, and arguing that "[t]o restrict appellants to the crystalline form dis
closed . . . would be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad protection for pio
neer inventions . . . ."); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
(interpreting a patent that, when written in 1984, covered only mouse-derived antibodies, to cover
all sorts of antibodies developed between 1984 and 1999, including chimeric and humanized anti
bodies).
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32
called "reverse doctrine of equivalents." Testing infringement at the time of

infringement necessarily suggests that the claims should be interpreted as of

the time of infringement; it is the correspondence between the claims and
the accused device that is the essence of infringement. And some courts
have in fact construed the meaning of patent claims for infringement pur

poses as of the time of infringement, not as of the time of invention, filing,
or issue. In

Laser Alignment, for example, the court interpreted the phrase

"beam of light" to include a laser, a technology that did not exist at the time
33
the patent issued. Other courts come to the same conclusion not with re

spect to literal infringement but under the doctrine of equivalents, where it is
34

well settled that the relevant time is the time of infringement.

The timing of claim construction, then, would appear to vary depending
on the reason the claim is being construed. For some purposes we under

stand claim terms to mean what they meant to the PHOSITA at the time of

invention. At other times we interpret claim terms as they are understood at
the time the patent application is filed, at the time the patent issues, or at the
time the patent is allegedly infringed. And because a significant period of
time can elapse between each of these events-a year or two between inven
35
tion and filing, 2.77 years on average but sometimes more than ten years
3
between filing and issue, 6 and several years between issue and infringe
31
ment -it is quite common that the meaning of claim terms will differ

32. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 Tux. L. REV. 989 (1997); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Break
down: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). The reverse
doctrine of equivalents excuses literal infringements where the defendant's product is so far changed
in principle from the patented invention that it would be inequitable to find liability. Westinghouse v.
Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 562 (1898); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genen
tech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The doctrine would make no sense if patents did not
cover later-developed technologies at all.
33.

Laser Alignment, 491 F.2d at 866.

34. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997), holds that
reasonable interchangeability of elements and accused products in the doctrine of equivalents is
determined at the time of infringement, not earlier.
35. P atent Jaw strongly encourages prompt filing once an invention is made. Unreasonable
delay in filing a patent application after the invention is made will defeat a claim to priority under 35
U.S.C.§ 102(g) (2000). Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (delay caused by attorney
backlog was not excusable). Under 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b), a one-year grace period is given after an
inventor makes some public use or sale of the invention. 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b) (2000). But European
Jaw has no similar grace period, giving patent applicants a strong incentive to file as soon as possi
ble after invention, and in any event before selling the invention or publishing it.
36.
Allison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?, supra note 10, at 2101 (patent prosecution
takes 2.77 years on average); Lemley & Moore, supra note 10, at 113 (1.38% of all applications
spend eight or more years in prosecution).
37. Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 237 (finding that, on average,
12.3 years elapse between the filing of a patent application and the resolution of an infringement
suit). To be sure, much of this time is spent in litigation after infringement has already occurred. Cf
John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (finding that most patent lawsuits
are filed rather quickly after the patent issues). But infringement generally continues during the
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depending on the time at which the courts define them. Under these long
standing principles, we cannot define the meaning of a patent claim in the
abstract. Instead, a patent claim has different meanings depending on the
reason we ask the question.
B. Defining Patent Claims Consistently
A second, equally venerable principle of patent law makes it clear that
patent claims are to be construed consistently for validity and infringement
purposes. B oth patent owners and accused infringers have a strong incentive
to interpret patent claims differently for different purposes. Patent owners
would like their patent claims to be construed broadly in infringement pro
ceedings, so that they cover defendants' products, but would generally like
their claims to be construed narrowly when it comes to validity, to avoid the
risk of either treading on the prior art or claiming more than the patentee has
enabled or described. Accused infringers want the opposite-patents that are
narrow and not infringed, but are broad enough to run afoul of §§ 102, 103,
or 112.
The court has rejected efforts by both patentees and accused infringers
to read patent claims inconsistently when it benefits them to do so. Rather,
the claims of a particular patent must be read consistently in a particular
case. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected efforts by litigants to argue
for one meaning in the validity context and a different meaning in the in
38
fringement context.
To paraphrase Donald Chisum, obviousness,
enablement, and infringement are an "eternal golden braid" bound together
39
by the language of the patent claims. For the doctrines to be consistent, the
claims obviously must have a consistent meaning for each patent. And in
deed on at least one occasion the Federal Circuit has departed from the
principles discussed in the last Section in order to ensure that a claim mean
ing was consistent over time. In Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. Lucks Co. , it
held that "when a patent claim term understood to have a narrow meaning
when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal
scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of
40
filing." Inferential support for this result can also be found in Texas Digital,
pendency of the suit, so the "time of infringement" may actually encompass a range of dates begin
ning on the date the defendant starts making the product and extending many years into litigation.
38. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Be
cause the claims of a patent measure the invention at issue, the claims must be interpreted and given
the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analysis."); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3
Sys., Inc., 157F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Beachcombers Int'I, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods.,
Inc., 31F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
39. Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden
Braid, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 57 (1987). Chisum refers to anticipation and obviousness, but the logic of the
braid extends to infringement as well. See Roy H. Wepner, The Patent Invalidity/Infringement Paral
lel: Symmetry or Semantics?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 67 (1988).
40.
Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). But see Su
perguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Kopykake
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where the court explained that the dictionaries and treatises courts could use
in defining claim terms were those published at the time the patent issued,
not those published later. 41 This approach makes sense only if the term has a
meaning that is fixed in time.
In practice, courts have approached claim construction as if the claims
had a single meaning throughout time . After the Supreme Court determined
2
that claim construction was a question of law for the court, 4 district courts
began the now-ubiquitous practice of holding pretrial "Markman hearings"
in which they explicated the meaning of patent claims. In my experience,
courts use Markman hearings to define claim terms in a single way. They do
not define those terms differently for different purposes. I have never been
involved in or even heard of a case in which the court defined the same term
in two different ways for purposes of different sections of the patent statute,
despite the case law discuss�d in the last Section suggesting that courts
should do exactly that. Indeed, I am not even aware of attorneys who have
argued in a Markman hearing that a particular term should have different
meanings for different purposes. As a practical matter, lawyers and courts
seem to ignore the cases discussed in the previous Section, except perhaps
to choose one particular time at which to fix the meaning in any given case.
The idea that words should have a consistent meaning also has strong in
tuitive resonance. People know--or think we know-what words mean, and
we resist the postmodern idea that meanings are contingent and can change
over time. This is particularly true in science, where we like to think that the
3
rules are fixed and unyielding. 4 While the postmodernists are obviously
right to some extent-the meaning of words is contextually driven and so
cially constructed-instinct tells us that to conclude that the same words in
the same document have different meanings for different purposes leads us
by the short road to chaos.
II.

C HOOSING BETWEEN T H E APPROAC HES

Which approach is right? In this Part, I argue that courts should take a
unified approach to claim construction, interpreting patent claims as they
would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the patent application was first filed. Section II.A explains why a unified
approach is preferable to variable meanings. I also argue in that Section that
was limited to circumstances in which the patentee had expressly limited its invention to "conven
tional" or existing technology).
41. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Other Federal
Circuit panels have suggested different times besides issuance at which meaning should be tested. In
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court suggested that the date
of application might be the correct date, or possibly even the date of invention. Id. at 1367 n.2. The
discussion in that case was dictum, however, because the court noted that the meaning of the terms
at issue had not changed over time.
42.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

43. But cf. PETER GALISON, How EXPERIMENTS END (1987) (discussing how context and
expectation affect scientific experiments).
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courts should take a uniform approach in all cases, not just those few cases
in which a conflict actually arises between different meanings. Section 11.B
argues that the meaning of the claims should be fixed as of the time of filing
and deals with some complications that arise from the prosecution process.
Section 11.C explains why a focus on filing date won't undermine patent
incentives in the important case of later-developed technology.
A.

Justifying Unified Claim Construction

The complex of rules described in Part I.A has considerable theoretical
44
In the abstract, it may make sense to judge the meaning of a patent
45
claim term from different perspectives for different purposes. But doing so
appeal.

is simply not practical. Adherence to the different meanings approach cre
ates unsolvable problems in actually litigating and deciding patent cases. We
managed to avoid confronting those problems for many years because we
handed the entire question of claim construction to the jury, and blithely
assumed that they understood and applied the complex of timing rules. The

Markman

decision made transparent the process of claim construction, and

so exposed these difficulties. These practical problems fall into four catego
ries.
First, permitting the same claim term to mean different things invites
gaming of the claim construction process. Both patent owners and accused
infringers face a tension in patent litigation between their validity arguments
and their infringement arguments. The more broadly a patent is interpreted,
the more likely it is to be infringed, but the more likely it also is to be inva
lid. Patent owners will try to avoid this tension by arguing that the invention
should be construed narrowly for validity purposes but broadly for in
fringement purposes; accused infringers will argue the opposite. These
arguments may prove more persuasive than one might think; empirical evi
dence suggests that factfinders in patent cases tend to vote on party rather
46
Courts foreclose

than issue lines, ruling entirely for or against a patentee.

these efforts to have it both ways by demanding that parties define claim
terms consistently throughout a lawsuit. If they can't do that, it will prove

44.
I am no fan of simplicity merely for the sake of simplicity and in fact have argued else
where that patent law needs fewer bright-line rules and more flexible standards that can adapt to the
complex, industry-specific environment of innovation. See DAN L. Buruc & MARK A LEMLEY,
TAILORING INNOVATION LAW: SHAPING PATENT POLICY FOR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (forthcoming
2006). The right question, as always, is comparative: what do we gain and what do we lose from
making a particular rule more complex?
45. Or it may not. The automatic extension of patent scope over time as the meaning of
words changes can do significant damage to social welfare, as it threatened to do in the Chiron case.
46. See Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 245 (finding that in cases
involving multiple patents, factfinders held the patents either all valid or all invalid in 86.7% of the
cases). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has several times confronted cases in which the jury apparently
treated the claims differently for validity and infringement purposes in order to rule for the same
party on both issues. See, e.g., Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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difficult to avoid having the parties twist the meaning of words in ways that
support their interests in a particular case.
Second, defining patent claim terms to mean different things for differ
ent purposes significantly complicates the efforts of competitors to predict
the scope and validity of patents. In recent years, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly emphasized the notice function of patent claims, limiting the
reach of patent law's doctrine of equivalents because of concerns that com
7
petitors could not predict how that doctrine might be applied. 4 To be sure,
there are many problems with the notice function of patents. It is not clear
8
that competitors actually read patents, 4 and even if they do the existing
opacity of claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents make it diffi
9
cult already to predict the scope of a competitor's patents. 4 Making claim
construction even more convoluted will hardly help matters.
Third, defining patent claim terms to mean different things for different
purposes would complicate the modem practice of Markman hearings.
Courts normally construe patent claims at a separate hearing held in advance
50
of trial or summary judgment. In theory, at least, they construe those claim
terms based on the understanding of the PHOSITA and without focusing on
5
how the construction of the term will affect the outcome of the case. 1
In order to construe claims differently for different purposes, courts would
have to abandon this rule, because they would be unable to define the

47. See, e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("The object of the patent law
in requiring the patentee to [distinctly claim an invention] is not only to secure to him all to which
he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still left open to them."); Sage Prods., Inc. v.
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[C)laims . . . put[) competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed inven
tion.").
48. There are two reasons why lawyers discourage their clients from reading competitors'
patents. First, if a client is aware of a patent that might constitute prior art to its own invention, it
must disclose that patent to the PTO, complicating the client's efforts to obtain its own patents.
Second, if a client becomes aware of a patent that covers its product and continues to make that
product, it may be held a willful infringer liable for treble damages. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh
K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TucH. L.J. 1085 (2003). W hile the
Federal Circuit changed the law in 2004 to eliminate the obligation to waive privilege by obtaining a
legal opinion and disclosing it to the court whenever put on notice of a patent, see Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane), as a
practical matter there are still strong reasons to obtain and disclose such letters and therefore waive
privilege once one learns of a patent. The disincentive to read patents therefore persists.
49. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2; John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doc
trine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LE WIS & CLARK L. REv. 153 (2005).
50. There is no obligation to hold such a hearing before construing the patent claims, see
Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001), but the
overwhelming majority of district courts do so.
51. Swimways Corp. v. Overbreak LLC, 354 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("[l]n no
instance should claims be construed in light of the allegedly infringing device; it is only after the
patent claims have been properly construed that they are applied to the accused device to determine
whether infringement exists."). See also JOHN w. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC
PRINCIPLES I :44 (2004). However, Schlicher notes that judges may look at the accused device in
order to understand and focus the claim construction process, and the line between these two is
elusive.
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meaning of a term until they knew why the meaning mattered-for obvi
ousness, enablement, or infringement purposes. It would also add to the
administrative burden on district court judges. Busy district court judges
already resist being asked to determine the meaning of multiple terms in
multiple claims, particularly in the large fraction of cases that involve multi
ple patents. They require parties to select representative patents and
representative claims for decision, demand that parties agree on the mean
ings of all but a few claim terms, and impose significant limits on briefing
and argument over claim terms (imposing a twenty-five page limit on brief
52
ing regardless of the number of claim terms at issue, for example). These
judges are likely to resist expanding their Markman role to construe each
disputed term two or more times; even if they do so, the result will be to
make Markman hearings longer and more complex.
Finally, even if judges are willing to add to the complexity of claim con
struction, their contingent constructions of particular terms are likely to
confuse the jury. The court will have to instruct the jury that the same term
means different things for different purposes. Juries may or may not under
stand this instruction, which is likely to strike them as counterintuitive, but
at a minimum it will make their burden of deciding patent cases more oner
ous.
These costs are potentially substantial. Whether they are worth incurring
depends largely on whether the different-constructions approach offers sub
stantial benefits, an issue to which I tum in the next Section. Before I do,
however, it is worth considering a hybrid approach. One of the reasons
courts and commentators have succeeded in ignoring the tension I describe
in this paper is that relatively few cases actually present the conflict directly.
The conflict only arises in those cases in which both infringement and valid
ity are at issue, and the meaning of a claim term changes between invention
and infringement in an outcome-determinative way. One possible approach
would be to maintain the existing temporally-driven rules for the ordinary
case, but to apply a uniform standard in the minority of cases in which the
53
change in the meaning of the terms would affect the outcome of the case.
54
The Federal Circuit seemed to take this approach in Kopykake, where it
demanded uniformity in the case before it without rejecting the general
principle that the meaning of patent claim terms should be judged at differ
ent times for different purposes. And in Inverness it noted that "[o]ur
decisions have not always been consistent" with respect to the timing of

52.
See, e.g., Standing Order for Patent Cases 'll 5, Sept. 7, 2004 (standing order of
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the Northern District of California), available at http://
www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/f439a7615af0ad8188256d48005fd22b/25fd69a0d98a3c7f88256d
48005ffdcd$FILF/Standing% 200rders%20for%20Patent% 20Cases%20-%20JSW.pdf (last visited June
7, 2005).
53.
This approach, like my preferred approach, would still require deciding from what per
spective that uniform standard will be tested, albeit in a smaller group of cases. I discuss that issue
in the next Section.
54.

Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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claim construction, but declined to resolve that inconsistency because the
55
meaning of the term was the same at all relevant times in the case before it.
I think this hybrid approach is insufficient. It complicates claim con
struction even more than the temporally-driven approach does. The hybrid
approach requires courts to determine the meaning of some claim terms at
different times, incurring some of the complexity and gaming costs de
scribed above. In addition, it imposes a second layer of rules to be applied to
some but not all claim constructions. The meaning of patent claims can't be
determined ex ante at all, because neither competitors nor the courts can
know whether the uniform rule or the variant rule would apply until they
determined whether two different meanings would be at issue in the particu
lar case that comes before the court. The meaning of a term would exist in a
sort of quantum superposition, collapsing to a particular meaning fixed at a
particular point in time only when the factfinder makes the decision to
56
look. The hybrid approach might also mean that even for the same pur
pose, the same term may take on different meanings in cases against
different defendants. The meaning for, say, infringement purposes would be
fixed at a uniform time (the filing date) in one case and would be deter
mined as of the infringement date in another case that didn't present the
57
problem of inconsistent meanings. Such a result would be uncertain, ma
nipulable, and intellectually unsatisfying.
B. Selecting a Time for Determining Claim Meaning

If the law is to settle on a particular time at which the meaning of claim
terms should be determined, what should that time be? There are four obvi
ous choices, mapping to the four different times at which the law currently
fixes meaning: at the time of invention, at the time of filing, at the time of
issue, or at the time of infringement. As I noted in Section I.A, courts have
used each approach in different contexts. Courts that seem to apply a uni
form standard have often set that standard as of the time the patent issues,
58
looking to dictionaries from that time, though other Federal Circuit panels

55.
2002).

Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.2 (Fed. Cir.

56.

This was the fate of Schrtidinger's unfortunate (and mercifully apocryphal) cat. See, e.g. ,

JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND REALITY (1984). Re

gardless whether the cat would truly be both alive and dead, a question upon which physicists
disagree, the claim construction would exist in an ambiguous state until we knew the context of the
lawsuit in which the claim would be construed.
57. This latter problem is likely to come up only in a few cases since, if a term has changed
meanings over time in an outcome-determinative way, those changes are likely to come up in each
subsequent infringement case.
58. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The role of
dictionaries was sharply limited by the Federal Circuit en bane this year. P hillips v. AWH Corp., No.
03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). But dictionar
ies will still be relevant in some circumstances under the Phillips standard, and so determining the
proper date for the dictionary still matters.
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have suggested that the invention date or the filing date might be the appro
59
priate measure. In this Section, I argue that the best option is to determine
the meaning of patent claim terms as of the date the patent application is
filed.
To begin, it seems rather easy to dismiss the idea that the meaning of
claim terms should be defined for all purposes as of the date of infringe
ment. Doing so would require the scope of patents to change over time, not
only for infringement purposes (in which we have long accepted just such
60
an oddity) but also for validity purposes. The PTO would never be able to
determine the validity of a patent, since the meaning of the patent claims
could not be fixed at a point in time. Even after it issued, a patent's scope
would not be fixed, but could differ from infringer to infringer as time
passes. As a result, the same patent could be valid at certain times and i nva
lid at others, depending on the meaning of terms at the time of infringement.
Further, claims valid at the time of issuance would become invalid for lack
of enablement as the meaning of those claim terms changed. As the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals warned in In re Hogan, "[t]here cannot, in an
effective patent system, be such a burden placed on the right to broad
61
claims." No court has suggested that the meaning of patent claims for va
lidity purposes should be mutable over time in this way, and the debilitating
uncertainty associated with these changes counsels against adopting it.
A second possibility is that the meaning of patent claim terms could be
fixed as of the time the patent issues. Texas Digital implicitly took this ap
proach, though it did not justify it expressly. The Federal Circuit has also
62
endorsed use of the issue date in other cases as well. Using the date of is
sue has a certain logic to it; after all, it is as of the issue date that the
language of the patent claims is established in fixed form, so perhaps it
makes sense that that is the date on which we should define the meaning of
those claims. Nonetheless, I do not think issue date is the right choice. A
substantial period of time can elapse between the time the patent is filed and
when it issues. While the time a patent spends in prosecution is 2.77 years
63
on average, litigated patents spend substantially more time (3.6 years on
64
average), and a small but important subset of patents spend eight or more

59. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); E
P ass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Universal Oil P rods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1943)
("[T]he meaning which the inventor gives to his words can not [sic) be made to depend upon subse
quent events, but should appear when the application is filed.").
60.

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).

61.

In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

62. See, e.g., Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1 373, 1378 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (choosing issue date, but noting the conflict and concluding that it didn't matter for
the resolution of this case).
63.

Allison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?, supra note IO, at 2118.

64.

Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note IO, at 237.
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65
years in prosecution. Importantly, if a patent spends a long time in prose
cution, it is generally because the applicant has voluntarily chosen to extend
66
prosecution by filing multiple continuation applications. The fact that the
patentee has substantial power to control when the patent issues and with
67
what claims gives rise to concerns about gaming the system. In Chiron v.
Genentech, for example, Chiron filed a patent application in 1984, but re
wrote the claims of the still-pending patent in 1999 to cover "monoclonal
antibodies," a term that had a very different and much broader meaning in
68
1999 than it did in 1984. Giving that term its 1999 meaning is unfair in two
respects: it may disadvantage competitors by allowing the patentee to in
clude within the scope of the patent technologies she did not invent, and it
may disadvantage the patentee by imposing an impossible burden of de
scribing and enabling, as of 1984, technologies that were not developed
69
until much later. The prospect of such manipulation by patent owners
counsels against defining patent terms as of the issue date. Issue date would
also seem an odd choice because it is not normally the default in the tempo
ral-differences model. Only the interpretation of the support in the patent
specification for a means-plus-function claim is tested as of the time of issu
ance, so adopting the issue date would require a greater change in practice
than other baselines. Finally, setting the meaning of terms as of the issue
date would effectively foreclose any possibility of claim construction at the
PTO, since it would have to construe a term whose meaning wouldn't be
established until after it was done examining the claim. The PTO doesn't
engage in claim construction today, applying instead the "broadest reason
70
able construction" that can be given to a claim. But commentators have
71
suggested that it could do so, something that would be feasible only if the
meaning of a claim term were fixed sometime before prosecution was com
pleted.

65. Lemley & Moore, supra note 10, at 113 (stating that l .38% of all patents spend more
than eight years in prosecution).
66. Id. ; see also Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994) (finding that half of the patents that spend the most time in prosecution are
submarine patents).
67. See, e.g. , Lemley & Moore, supra note 10 (explaining how patentees can use continua
tion practice to control when and if the patent issues, and to wear down examiners who object to
particular claims).
68.

Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2002).

69. Indeed, both of these things happened in Chiron: the court found infringement because it
gave "monoclonal antibodies" its broader 1999 meaning, but ultimately invalidated the patent on
enablement and written description grounds. Id. at 1192. The written description decision was af
firmed by the Federal Circuit. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
70.

In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

71.

See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for
Dictionaries in the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript
on file with author) (arguing that an applicant should have to commit to definitions of terms during
patent prosecution).
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This leaves us with two options-determining the meaning of claims as
of the time of invention or the time of filing. Both seem plausible to me.
12
Both are widely used already in the temporal-differences model. Both are
focused at or about the time the invention is made, which seems the logical
time to base at least validity determinations. I am inclined to believe that the
filing date is the right choice. It is a fundamental rule of claim construction
3
that the patentee can be her own lexicographer.7 To do so, the patentee de
fines the claim terms in the specification at the time of filing. The patentee
hasn't written the claims yet at the time of invention, and if the invention is
truly innovative it may take time to come up with the right terminology.74
Choosing the time of filing gives the PHOSITA some time to learn the
meaning of new terms as knowledge of the invention diffuses through the
scientific community and permits the patentee an opportunity to help deter

mine the meaning of those claim terms. Subsequent discussion in the
prosecution history can clarify what the terms meant when filed, but it is the

time of filing that should be the key. Finally, it is easy to determine the date
of filing, and harder to determine the date of invention. Indeed, if we move
�
to a first to file system, as seems possible at this writing,7 the date of inven
tion will be irrelevant for almost all purposes, and it would be better not to
have to identify that date for purposes of claim construction.
Choosing either the time of invention or the time of filing requires us to
deal with one potential anomaly: patent claims can be amended after the
time of filing. What happens when a claim term is added after filing? This
can occur in three different settings. First, a patentee might file a reissue
application, seeking different claim language. A reissue patent relates back
to the original if it does not broaden the claims, but is subject to intervening

72.
A number of cases rely on the filing date as the relevant date for claim construction. See,
e.g. , PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bayer AG v.
Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1 347,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 1 38 F.3d 1448, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1 998) (en
bane) (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Other cases rely on the invention date. See, e.g., Metabolite Labs.,
Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1 374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit's en bane decision in Markman is frequently cited by district
courts for the proposition that the meaning of claims is determined at the time of the invention. See,
e.g., Microstrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 432 (E.D. Va. 2004); Honeywell Int'!,

Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 865 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,
No. Civ.A.03-3 138, 2004 WL 1 658530 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2004).
73.

See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir.

1999); cf Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 71 (arguing that patentees should pick a dictionary as of
their filing date to be used to construe the patent).
74.

An additional problem with invention date is that figuring out when an invention is made

turns out to be complicated, based on a combination of conception dates, reduction to practice dates,
diligence in reduction to practice, and abandonment after reduction to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(2000) . Courts need to make these determinations only in a small subset of cases, see Mark A. Lem
ley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1 299 (2003), and it would be simpler if we didn't force them to do so in other cases.
75.
See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 2005) (proposing to change to a first-inventor-to
file system).
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76
rights if it does broaden the claims. A reissue application should count as a
new filing for purposes of the date at which meaning is to be determined
only if it is a broadening reissue whose effective date is later than the origi
nal patent. Second, a patentee might add new material to the specification to
accompany the claims by filing what is called a "continuation-in-part" ap
plication. In this case the solution is easy-the "filing date" of a CIP
application is the date the matter supporting the particular claim term is
added to the patent. Finally, a patent applicant may amend her claims during
prosecution without changing the specification. If she does, the new claims
must find support in the initial application. While the claims may be added
during prosecution, they presumably have a meaning based on the specifica
tion written at the time of filing, so the focus on filing date shouldn't prove
problematic. If it is-if the patent includes claim terms that would not be
understood by the PHOSITA at the time of filing based either on his outside
knowledge or on the disclosures of the s�ecification-the patent claim is
invalid in any event for lack of enablement. 7
The Federal Circuit may have made the right choice in its recent en bane
78
decision in Phillips. That opinion says: "We have made clear, moreover,
that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent applica
tion." 19 The issue was not briefed in the case, and the court did not cite the
numerous cases holding the contrary. So it is possible to dismiss this state
ment as dictum. Further, the fact that the court seemed to think invention
date and filing date were the same leaves its precise conclusion a bit uncer
tain. Nonetheless, I am optimistic that the court's statement reflects not only
80
a resolution of the conflicting case law, but the correct resolution.

C. The Scope of Patents Under a Filing-Date Standard
Choosing to define patent claim terms as they would be understood at
the time the patent application was filed means that the literal meaning of

76.

35 u.s.c. § 252 (2000).

35 U.S.C.§ 112, para. l (2000 ) requires that the patentee teach a person of ordinary skill
77.
in the art how to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
78. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 03-1269, 03-1 286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1 3954 (Fed. Cir.
July 12, 2005) (en bane).
79.

Id. at *22 (emphasis added).

80. The Federal Circuit has recently resolved many of the conflicts that characterized its
jurisprudence in the 1990s, lending more clarity and predictability to patent law. In addition to this
issue, see id. (resolving the dispute over interpretive sources for claim construction); Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (re
solving problematic rules regarding willfulness); Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv.
Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane) (resolving conflict over doctrine of dedication to the
public domain); Burk & Lemley, Inherency, supra note 17 (discussing the court's recent clarification
of the inherency doctrine).
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patent claims will not expand over time as the meaning of those terms
81
changes. Cases like Hogan and Chiron that expand the literal meaning of
those claims, creating a "temporal disparity" between meaning for validity
83
82
purposes and meaning for infringement purposes, will have to be rejected.
Some will consider this a good thing because it reduces the likelihood of
8
blocking patents 4 and limits the ability of patent "trolls" to claim to own
85
something that they did not in fact invent. But limiting inventors to owning
what they thought of can also present problems, particularly for pioneering
inventions at an early stage in the development of a technology. The protec
tion provided by a patent may be hollow if it does not confer the ability to
prevent logical applications of the principle of the invention to new and un
86
foreseen circumstances.
This does not mean, however, that the patents themselves cannot cover
later-developed technologies. Patentees can use the doctrine of equivalents
to reach such technologies. Indeed, covering equivalent technology not con
templated when the patent claims were written is one of the major benefits
of the doctrine of equivalents. While the Federal Circuit has gone to signifi
cant lengths in recent years to cabin the scope of the doctrine of equivalents
in order to prevent abuse of the doctrine, those restrictions have little or no
application to the case of later-developed technology. The doctrine of prose
cution history estoppel, which precludes a patentee who narrows her claims
87
from later recapturing that ground under the doctrine of equivalents, con
tains an exception permitting the doctrine of equivalents to apply to
technologies that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the claims

8 1 . The effective scope of those claims may still expand over time for another reason: com
petitors may develop new products unknown at the time of the patentee's invention that fit within
the literal language of the patent claims. Thus, a patentee may claim a genus consisting of 1 ,000
species, including some that neither the patentee nor anyone else has specifically identified. Over
time, as new species within the genus are discovered, the practical scope of the patent is broadened
to cover new products. But the legal scope of the claimed invention remains the same.
82.
Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady·
A lexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REv. 359, 379 n.73 ( 1 992).
83.
Some decisions have taken the position that meaning is "axiomatically" the same for
purposes of validity and infringement, an approach that impliedly rejects Hogan. See, e.g., Smith·
Kline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1 33 1 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 1 4 F.3d 1 3 13, 1 330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Indeed, Judge Bryson, concurring in
Chiron, would have reached this result expressly, construing the patent claims "as they would have
been understood by one of skill in the art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to
reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant did not enable." Chiron Corp. v. Genen
tech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1 263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring); see also In re Hogan, 559
F.2d 595, 609-1 1 (C.C.P.A. 1 977) (Miller, J., concurring in part). This approach, with which I agree,
would not have changed who won the Chiron case, but would have changed the basis for that result
from invalidity to noninfringement.
84.

On blocking patents, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 32.

85.

See, e.g. , Feldman, supra note 12.

86. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et . al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 1 6 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1 045 (200 1 ).
87.

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 1 7 ( 1 997).
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ss
were changed. The rule that the doctrine of equivalents cannot extend to
s9
cover the prior art will not apply to later-developed technology, which by
definition cannot be in the prior art. And the doctrine of dedication to the
public domain, which prevents a patentee from covering under the doctrine
of equivalents an implementation described in the specification but not
90
claimed in the patent, by definition will not apply to technologies not con
templated at the time the patent was filed. Freed of these substantial
limitations, the doctrine of equivalents remains robust enough to take the
place of decisions like Hogan in ensuring that pioneering patents retain ef
fective scope as improvers develop next-generation technologies.
The corollary concerns the continued importance of the reverse doctrine
of equivalents. The reverse doctrine of equivalents is a rare but potentially
important defense to infringement where the accused infringer has radically
91
improved the patented technology. The Federal Circuit has recently ques
tioned the continuing vitality of the doctrine, however. In Tate Access
Floors, Judge Gajarsa suggested that the limitations of § 1 12 obviated the
need for the reverse doctrine of equivalents because they prevented patent
ees from including later-developed technologies within the literal scope of
92
the patent. Under existing law, this is not true. Because the meaning of
claim terms for § 1 1 2 purposes is determined at the time of filing, while the
meaning for infringement purposes is determined later, the literal scope of
the patent may expand over time in ways that the enablement and written
description requirements cannot effectively control. Were the court to adopt
a clear rule of uniform meaning, this problem would go away, and the re
93
verse doctrine of equivalents would become less important.

88. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en bane); see
also Conigliaro et al., supra note 86.
89. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed.
Cir. 1 990); cf. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1 357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting Wilson to doctrine of equivalents cases; if literal claims of a patent cover
the prior art the remedy is to hold the claims invalid).
90.

Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane).

91.

See Lemley, supra note 32; Merges, supra note 32; Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on
Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'v 878 ( 1 99 1 ).
92.
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368. Since that decision the Federal Circuit has made
reference to the reverse doctrine of equivalents on several occasions, however, suggesting its contin
ued vitality. See, e.g., Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 3 1 8 F.3d 1 1 32 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Plant
Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 3 1 5 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 1 4 F.3d 1 3 1 3 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
93.
It still wouldn't be the case that the doctrine served no purpose, however. Even with
unified meaning, the reverse doctrine of equivalents will still be important in cases in which the
accused infringer makes a radical improvement that clearly falls within the meaning of the claims as
written. But the number of cases in which the reverse doctrine might apply would decline.
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Two different, conflicting legal regimes for construing patent claims

have coexisted for some time. The growth of Markman hearings heightens

this conflict by requiring express claim construction by judges. The Federal

Circuit must choose between the benefits of integrated claim construction
and the niceties of time-differentiated claim construction. The only practical

approach is to abandon differentiation in the interest of a simple, internally
consistent understanding of patent claims.

The logical way to unify the meaning of patent claim terms is to fix that
meaning at the time of filing. Doing so does not mean we have to aban
don the principle that patents can cover later-developed technologies,
though it does mean we must seek the source of that principle in the doc
trine of equivalents rather than · in the accident of changing meaning.
That's a feature of my approach, not a bug. The original purpose of the
doctrine of equivalents was to reach later-developed technologies,94 and
it is still most effective in doing so. The benefit we will gain from giving
patent claims a consistent meaning is substantial.

94. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673 ( 1989).

